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Abstract
We study how electoral systems affect the presence of women in politics using a model 
in which both voters and parties might have a gender bias. We apply the model to Spanish 
municipal elections, in which national law mandates that municipalities follow one of two 
different electoral systems: a closed-list system in which voters pick one party-list, or an 
open-list system, in which voters pick individual candidates. Using a regression discontinuity 
design, we fi nd that the closed-list system increases the share of women among candidates 
and councilors by 2.5 percentage points, and the share of women among mayors by 4.3 
percentage points. Our model explains these results as mostly driven by voter bias against 
women. We provide evidence that supports the mechanism of the model. In particular, we 
show that, when two councilors almost tied in general-election votes, the one with “one more 
vote” is substantially more likely to be appointed mayor, but this does not happen when the 
most voted was female and the second was male, suggesting the presence of some voter bias. 
We also show that, in a subsample of municipalities with low bias — proxied by having had 
a female mayor in the past — the difference between the two electoral systems disappears. 
Keywords: voting, electoral systems, gender bias, regression discontinuity.
JEL classifi cation: D72, J16, J71.
Resumen
Estudiamos cómo afecta el sistema electoral a la presencia de mujeres en política usando un 
modelo en el que tanto los votantes como los partidos pueden tener un sesgo de género. 
Aplicamos el modelo a las elecciones municipales españolas, en las que, según la ley, los 
municipios utilizan dos sistemas electorales distintos: uno de listas cerradas, en el que 
los votantes votan por un partido, o uno de listas abiertas, en el que votan por candidatos 
individuales. Usando un análisis de regresión discontinua, encontramos que el sistema de listas 
cerradas aumenta 2,5 puntos porcentuales la proporción de mujeres entre los candidatos y los 
concejales, y 4,3 puntos porcentuales entre los alcaldes. Según el modelo, estos resultados 
se explican por un sesgo de los votantes. Proporcionamos evidencia que apoya el mecanismo 
del modelo. En particular, mostramos que, con carácter general, cuando dos concejales casi 
empatan en votos, es considerablemente más probable que el que obtuvo «un voto más» 
sea nombrado alcalde, pero este resultado no se observa con generalidad cuando el más 
votado fue una mujer y el segundo un hombre, lo que sugiere la presencia de un cierto sesgo 
de género. También mostramos que, en una submuestra de municipios con poco sesgo 
—aquellos que han tenido una alcaldesa en el pasado—, la diferencia entre los dos sistemas 
electorales desaparece.
Palabras clave: votación, sistemas electorales, sesgos de género, regresión discontinua.
Códigos JEL: D72, J16, J71.
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1World Bank data as of 2017. See https : //data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS.
2For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that female leaders spend more in infrastructure that is
directly relevant to the needs of women.
3See, for example, Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2009) and Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and
Topalova (2012).
4See the discussion in Pande and Ford (2011). First, quotas can reduce women’s incentives to invest, if they believe
that their advancement is made easier by quotas. Second, quotas can be perceived as unfair and worsen attitudes
towards women—women selected through quotas may be stereotyped as less qualified. Third, they can even fail to
lift the barriers that prevent women from playing an influential role in politics. Bagues and Campa (2017a) study,
also in Spain, how the introduction of quotas in larger municipalities affected women’s presence in politics. They
find that quotas increased the share of female candidates and councilors, but failed to increase the share of women
among party leaders or mayors.
5By the electoral system, we mean the set of rules that determines how elections are conducted and their results
determined, especially how ballots are marked, cast, and counted.
6More specifically, given that voters can vote for candidates from different party-lists, it is a free list system.
Throughout the paper, we stick to the more general term open list.
7The 2007 Equality Law introduced gender quotas for Spanish elections, but only for municipalities of more than
3,000 inhabitants, which are far from the threshold and are therefore not used in our analysis.
1 Introduction
Women are underrepresented in politics. For example, they hold only 23% of legislative seats in
national assemblies.1 This situation has attracted much attention both in the media and in the
academic literature. Perhaps the most important reason behind this interest is that having women
in public office may have an impact on policy. There is evidence, for example, that female leaders
cater more to women’s needs.2 In addition, women in public office may serve as role models,
improving women’s self-confidence and affecting the attitudes of citizens towards women inside and
outside politics.3
How to increase the presence of women in politics is therefore a pressing question. In recent
decades, several countries have introduced gender quotas that require parties to field a minimum of
female candidates. There is consensus that quotas are successful in increasing female participation
in politics, but they have some drawbacks.4 In this paper we show, both theoretically and empiri-
cally, that electoral systems may have a sizable impact on women’s representation in the presence
of voter or party biases against women.5
Our analysis is based on Spanish municipal elections. We exploit the fact that, depending on
their population size, municipalities follow one of two different electoral systems. Municipalities
with more than 250 inhabitants must use a closed list (CL), proportional representation system
to elect a city council. Municipalities with 250 or fewer inhabitants must use an open list (OL)
system, in which voters can vote for up to four individual candidates from the same or different
parties.6 In the first meeting after the election, the council selects a mayor among the councilors.
In the CL system, only the councilors at the top of their party-lists can be selected, while in the
OL system any councilor can be selected. Therefore, these two systems differ starkly: in CL, voters
pick party-lists, while in OL, they pick individual candidates. Municipalities at both sides of the
population threshold are unaffected by gender quotas.7
This setup provides several attractive features. First, the electoral system is determined by
population size, as mandated by national law. This allows us to introduce a regression discontinuity
design, which is well known for providing credible estimates of causal effects (Lee and Lemieux
2010), and compare women’s representation in the two electoral systems. Second, the treatment
is clearly defined, as all the municipalities in one or the other electoral system must follow the
same rules. This is in opposition to cross-country studies, where it is inevitable to pool different
systems into the same category. Third, no other regulation changes at the threshold. Therefore,
the differences between municipalities at each side of the threshold can be confidently attributed
to the electoral system and not to some other fact. Finally, there are many observations close to
the threshold. There are around 2,400 municipalities in a window of 150 inhabitants, and data are
available for four election-years (2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015).
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8By bias we do not necessarily mean taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957), but rather whatever reasons why
voters or parties may have a net preference for men when all the other observable variables are kept constant.
We develop a model for candidate choice and mayor selection in which there are two types of
agents—voters and parties—which might have a gender bias.8 There is first a general election to
elect the councilors. After this election, elected councilors select among themselves a mayor, who
makes policy choices. Parties are office motivated and have to choose the candidates for the general
election from a limited supply of potential candidates, who differ in gender and competence. We
will say that there is voter bias if voters have a preference against women that makes them prefer
lower-competence men to more competent women. The size of the bias captures the extent to which
they are willing to trade off competence and gender. We will say that there is party bias if parties
have a preference against women that makes them prefer to increase the probability that a man
is in office at the expense of reducing the probability of winning the election. The size of the bias
captures the extent to which they are willing to trade off the probability of winning and gender.
Hence, parties may decide to choose fewer female candidates because they have a preference
against women (party bias), or because they internalize voter bias, knowing that biased voters are
less likely to vote for female candidates. Given that the mayor makes policy choices, we assume
that both voters and parties care about the competence and quality of the mayor. Thus, in CL,
voters and parties may have a bias against the top-listed candidate, who will become mayor if the
party wins the election. In contrast, in OL, voters may have a bias against all candidates in the
list, since voters do not know ex ante who will be later selected as mayor.
We show, both analytically and with numerical simulations, that the effect of the electoral
system on the share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors depends on the underlying source
of gender bias. In particular, in the presence of voter bias and no party bias, the CL system
results in a higher share of female councilors, while, in the presence of party and no voter bias,
the opposite is the case. In the CL system, both voter and party bias will lead parties to choose
fewer female candidates for the top spot of the list (as only the top-listed candidate can become
mayor). In the OL system, however, the incentives are different under voter and party bias. With
voter bias, parties have an incentive to choose fewer female candidates for all positions in the list,
as biased voters will penalize them. Hence, in this case, OL will result in fewer female councilors
than CL. With party bias, parties have an incentive to choose one male candidate (so that he may
be appointed mayor later) but will complete the list with the most competent candidates regardless
of their gender. Thus, the OL system results in a higher share of female councilors than CL, as
voters are unbiased in their choice among selected candidates.
We test the model predictions in the Spanish context. Regression discontinuity (RD) estimates
show that, relative to the OL system, the CL system increases the share of female candidates by
between 2 and 3 percentage points (p.p.), a relative increase of 8-12%. Similarly, the CL system
increases the share of female councilors by between 2 and 3 p.p. (9-14%) and the share of female
mayors by between 3.5 and 6 p.p. (22-37%). According to the model, these results imply that voter
bias is more relevant than party bias, as the model predicts that, in the presence of voter bias,
the CL system increases the share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors. By contrast, as
explained above, in the presence of party bias, the CL system should decrease the share of female
councilors.
We present three sets of results that support the mechanism of the model. First, using experience
as a control for competence, female candidates attract fewer votes than male candidates, suggesting
the presence of voter bias against women.9 Having a female candidate for mayor in a CL election
reduces the vote share of that list by 3.3 p.p., relative to having a male candidate. In OL, female
candidates attract 1.3 p.p. less votes than male candidates. We also show that the gender and
quality of the top-listed candidate in the CL system are more relevant than those of lower-ranked
candidates, as assumed in the model.
9These results hold after including municipality and party-year fixed effects, which may account for many unob-
servable factors that could affect the composition of the lists and the votes attracted by that list. However, given
that experience is admittedly a crude measure of competence, these regressions cannot be totally conclusive on the
presence of voter bias.
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Second, we study the mayor selection in the OL system, and provide evidence that (i) there
is a social norm that the councilor with most general election votes should become mayor: even
when the two most voted councilors almost tied in votes, the councilor with “one more vote” is 19
p.p. more likely to be appointed mayor; (ii) there are gender differences in the norm: it is followed
when the top two councilors are of the same gender, or when the first is male and the second is
female, but not when the first is female and the second is male, and (iii) voters enforce the norm
and its gender differences by punishing, in the next election, parties that deviate from it, further
suggesting the presence of voter bias against women.
Third, we test an additional prediction of the model—that, in the absence of voter and party
bias, the two electoral systems should lead to the same share of female candidates, councilors, or
mayors. To do so, we focus on a subsample of municipalities—those that have been exposed to a
female mayor in the past—in which we conjecture that voter or party biases are weaker. We first
show that, unlike what happens in the whole sample, female candidates do not attract fewer votes
than male candidates in the subsample of exposed municipalities, suggesting that, as conjectured,
voter and party biases are smaller in this subsample.10 We then estimate our RD regressions in
this subsample and find that the positive effect of CL on the share of female candidates, councilors,
and mayors disappears, as predicted by the model.
While the evidence is consistent with the mechanism proposed in the model, we discuss other
possible explanations to our findings, and conclude that they are unlikely to drive the results.
First, we analyze whether the effects can be driven by the difference in district magnitude—there
are seven councilors in CL, and five in OL. To assess whether district magnitude has an effect
separate from the effect of the ballot structure, we exploit the fact that, at 1,000 inhabitants, there
is another threshold, at which there is a change in district magnitude but not in ballot structure.
We perform a similar RD analysis and find no significant effects, against the hypothesis that the
district magnitude drives the results. Second, we discuss why the supply of candidates (women’s
willingness to run) cannot explain the entirety of our results. Third, we show that our findings are
unlikely to be driven by different party structures in the two electoral systems.
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, we add to the literature on the
effects of electoral systems on women’s representation in politics. Previous work has found that
CL systems increase women’s representation relative to OL systems (e.g., Thames and Williams
(2010) and Valdini (2012)).11 We add to this literature both empirically and theoretically. On the
empirical side, we contribute by providing evidence from a setting that allows us to obtain a clean
10We do not claim causality in that exposure to a female mayor reduces bias. It is indeed possible that exposure
to a female leader lowers voter bias (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova 2009), and it can reduce
party bias if elected mayors influence party politics at higher levels. But it is also possible that exposed municipalities
had a lower bias initially.
11Thames and Williams (2010) uses OLS cross-country regressions and Valdini (2012) exploits the reform of the
electoral system in Japan in 1994 to compare women’s representation before and after the reform. In contrast,
Schmidt (2009), using OLS cross-country regressions, does not find significant effects.
identification. Estimating the effects of electoral systems is challenging due to endogeneity issues.12
For this reason, exploiting discontinuities at population thresholds is becoming a popular way to
obtain credible estimates of causal effects. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the
first RD to estimate the effect of electoral systems on women’s representation. On the theoretical
side, the literature has discussed the importance of voter and party biases and how they can interact
with the electoral system, but we were still lacking a formal model that explicitly incorporates both
voter and party biases. We contribute by developing such model. Although we lay out the specifics
12Roberts, Seawright, and Cyr (2013) argue that most previous literature on the effects of electoral systems on
women’s representation suffers from serious methodological problems. They try to circumvent the issue using within-
country changes in electoral systems and matching methods, and find that the effect of electoral systems may not
be as large as previously thought. Similarly, Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2014) argue that the empirical
connection between electoral systems and descriptive representation might in fact be an endogenous rather than a
causal relationship.
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13As examples, it can be adapted to compare women’s representation in majoritarian and proportional represen-
tation systems, or to study the impact of double-preference voting conditioned on gender, as recently introduced in
Italian local elections.
14There are two possible reasons behind this difference. First, we study municipal elections while Esteve-Volart
and Bagues (2012) study national elections, and biases can operate differently, even within the same electorate. In
particular, voters may have been more exposed to women at national politics than at local politics, reducing their bias
in national elections. This explanation is consistent with Dahl, Kotsadam, and Rooth (2018), who find that exposure
to rank-and-file women in the military in Norway does not have a spillover effect on attitudes about higher up female
leadership, i.e. what is required is exposure to female leaders at the relevant level. Second, the municipalities that
we study are small and therefore carry little weight in the regressions of Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012). If bias
against women is more prevalent in small municipalities, then this can explain the different findings.
15Other related papers on the importance of norms are Anagol and Fujiwara (2016), who show that second-placed
candidates are substantially more likely than close third-placed candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections,
and Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2016), who show that narrow “list winners” of preferential voting in a general election
in Sweden are over 50% more likely to become party leaders than their runner-ups.
to match the Spanish context and obtain predictions for our empirical analysis, the model is flexible
and can be applied to other settings.13
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the reasons behind women’s under-
representation in politics. The literature has discussed three main possibilities: (i) that women’s
underrepresentation is supply-driven, with women shying away from politics, (ii) that it follows
from voter bias against women, and (iii) that it follows from party bias against women. We provide
evidence that allows us to disentangle voter and party biases. The results indicate that, in our
context, voter bias plays a more important role. These findings are in line with Fre´chette, Mani-
quet, and Morelli (2008) and De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo (2010), who suggest that the lack
of female legislators may reflect voter bias in France and Italy, respectively. However, they differ
from the findings in Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), who find that party bias is more prevalent
in elections to the Spanish Senate.14
Finally, we add to the growing literature on social norms—informal understandings that govern
individual behavior in society—in political environments. On this front, our paper is most closely
related Fujiwara and Sanz (2018).15 They provide evidence of a norm that “the most voted party
should form the government in a parliamentary system”, and show that such norm has important
implications for policy and the design of electoral systems. In this paper, we show that a similar
norm exists in bargaining among councilors of the same party, namely, that “the most voted
councilor should become mayor”. We go further by showing that the norm applies differently by
gender: the norm is followed when the two most voted councilors are of the same gender or when the
first is male and the second is female, but not when the first is female and the second is male. We
also provide evidence that, similarly to the norm in Fujiwara and Sanz (2018), the norm we identify
is enforced by voters, who punish in the next election parties that do not follow it. Voters also
enforce the gender differences: the punishment is larger (smaller) when the first is male (female)
and the second is female (male). In this regard, our findings are related to the growing literature
that suggests that men and women are punished differently for the same behavior or outcome.16
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the
institutional setting. Section 3 lays out the theoretical model and numerical simulation results.
Section 4 presents the data, the empirical strategy, and the results on the effect of the electoral
system on women’s representation. Section 5 presents the additional results that support the
mechanism of the model. Section 6 discusses other possible mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. The
appendix contains proofs, details of the numerical simulations, and ancillary discussions
2 Background: Spanish Municipal Elections
Spain is a highly decentralized country. It is divided into 17 regions and more than 8,000 mu-
nicipalities. Each municipality is run by a municipal government that has substantial autonomy:
16For example, female financial advisors are more likely to be fired for misconduct than male advisors (Egan, Matvos,
and Seru (2017)), and female surgeons are punished harder (receive less referrals) than male surgeons following a
patient death (Sarsons (2017)).
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they can set their own taxes (the most important being a property tax) and spend a considerable
amount of money (municipalities close to the threshold spend more than 600 euros per capita per
year on average—see Sanz (2017a)).17 It is important to note that, even though the 2007 Equality
Law mandates gender quotas, this is of no direct consequence for our study as only municipalities
of more than 3,000 inhabitants are subject to the law.18
Municipal elections are held simultaneously in all municipalities every four years. The electoral
system depends on the population size of the municipality in the year before municipal elections:
municipalities with a population of more than 250 inhabitants must use a CL proportional repre-
sentation, and those with 250 or fewer (but at least 100) inhabitants must use an OL system.19
This institutional framework was established by national law in 1978, before the first municipal
elections after Franco’s regime, and has not changed since then.20
Municipalities in the CL system elect a city council in a single-district election. All municipalities
in this system that are used for identification elect a seven-member council (larger municipalities
have larger councils, but, again, this is irrelevant for our purposes). Each party presents a list of
candidates and voters pick one of the party-lists.21 To convert votes into seats the D’Hondt rule
is used.22 Councilors are drawn from each list in the order in which the candidates are listed. For
example, if a party obtains four seats according to the votes obtained by the party-list, then the
17Municipal governments spend 13% of the overall spending of the country. Typical services that are provided
by small municipalities include public lighting, waste collection, cemeteries, street cleaning, road pavement, touristic
information to visitors, and local festivities.
18The threshold was 5,000 in 2007. The effect of this law is studied by Bagues and Campa (2017a), Bagues and
Campa (2017b), and Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015).
19Municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants use a completely different government system, namely, a direct
democracy system—see Sanz (2017a).
20The OL system for smaller municipalities was introduced after a proposal by the right-wing Alianza Popular, and
was only opposed by the Communist Party. The argument to introduce the OL system only in small municipalities
was that it is more likely that people know the candidates in those municipalities than in larger places.
21Typically, it is the provincial management of political parties that is responsible of making the lists. Provincial
managers have delegates at the municipal level, who talk to potential candidates and hence provide the provincial
managers with first-hand input to help create the lists.
22There is an electoral threshold at 5%, i.e. parties need to get at least 5% of the votes to enter the D’Hondt
distribution of seats. However, this threshold very rarely plays a role in the municipalities of interest here, due to the
low number of seats.
four candidates at the top of the list become councilors. In the first meeting after the election,
the council elects a mayor among the councilors. We call this election the “mayor selection”. In
CL, only councilors that were at the first spot of their party-lists can be appointed mayor. This
means that parties choose their candidate for mayor before the general election.23 Although the
council is responsible for approving the budget, controlling the governing bodies, and for the roll-
call vote of confidence on the mayor, mayors are the “the center of gravity of political life in the
municipality” and by law hold the most important executive functions and exercise leadership in
municipal politics (Valle´s and Brugue´ 2001).24 Mayors have a central role in running the government
by chairing council meetings and appointing and dismissing cabinet members and staff, and have
substantial control over determination and allocation of expenditures, since they prepare municipal
budgets and approve construction processes. Indeed, Spanish municipal governments exemplify a
case of strong executive power and have been described as municipal presidentialism (Magre-Ferran
and Bertrana-Horta 2005).
Municipalities in the OL system elect a city council of five members. Candidates are listed on
party-lists created by political parties, as in the CL system. However, voters do not pick one of the
party-lists, but rather check up to four candidates belonging to one or more party-lists. The five
most voted individual candidates are elected members of the council.25 As in the CL system, there
is a “mayor selection” in the first council meeting after the general election, in which the council
23Throughout the paper, we use the expressions “candidate for mayor” and “top-listed candidate” interchangeably.
24Mayors are very rarely removed by the council, further indicating their strength. In our sample, 96.5% of mayors
stayed the whole term.
25Technically, this is a limited voting system, as candidates can vote for a maximum number of candidates that is
lower than the number of seats in the council.
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selects a mayor among its members. Importantly, unlike in CL, all of the councilors can be elected
as mayors, not only those at the top spot of the party-lists. The roles of the council and the mayor
are identical under the two systems.
3 Theoretical Model
3.1 Setup
We consider a static setting with three types of agents: voters, candidates, and political parties.
There are two parties, A and B, that differ in their ideology and compete in an election. Voters
vote in a general election to elect the councilors. Each party presents a list of two candidates, and
three councilors are elected.26 We consider two electoral systems: CL and OL. Under CL, voters
choose the entire list of candidates from one party. Under OL, voters cast two preference votes
which are not restricted to be for the same party. Parties have to choose the two candidates in
their lists. Candidates are in limited supply and each party can choose from four options, two male
and two female. We assume that the competence, or quality, of candidates is i.i.d., drawn from the
same distribution and that, while it is perfectly observed by parties, it is only imperfectly observed
by voters.
After voting takes place, there is a mayor selection, in which the three elected councilors elect
a mayor among themselves. The mayor will implement policy during the term.27 Note that,
given that there are three elected councilors and only two parties, one party will always have the
26In Spanish municipal elections, as discussed, seven city councilors are elected in CL and five in OL. We argue in
the discussion of alternative mechanisms that this difference in the number of seats does not drive the results.
27In Spain, the mayor is much more influential than the other members of the council, as discussed in Section 2.
majority in the council. This matches the reality of elections in small Spanish municipalities.28
Only councilors at the top of the party-lists can be elected mayors in CL. Hence, the mayor will
always be the councilor at the top of the list of the party that has the majority in the council, i.e.
the party that obtained the most votes in the general election. In OL, by contrast, any councilor
can be elected mayor. Hence, the mayor will be either of the two councilors of the majority party.
There is a continuum of voters that care about the quality and gender of candidates and the
ideology of parties.29 We assume preferences are aggregated through a standard probabilistic voting
model as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). An explicit microfoundation is provided in appendix A.
To illustrate the results, we consider the comparison of two candidates, one from each party, A1
and B1. We assume that the indirect utilities that voter i receives from these candidates are given
by
vi(A1) = sA1 − μ g(A1)=f + σi + δ, (1)
vi(B1) = sB1 − μ g(B1)=f , (2)
where sx is the competence of candidate x, and g(x) is its gender, f for female and m for male.
The parameter μ ≥ 0 measures the average gender bias in the electorate.30 Since voters observe
candidate competence imperfectly, σi captures both the uncertainty in candidates competence, and
the importance of ideology from voting for party A. It is assumed that σi is uniformly distributed
with mean zero.31 Voters’ preferences are also affected by a common relative popularity shock, δ,
28In our sample, in municipalities under the OL system one party has a majority in 97.5% of the councils. In
municipalities under CL, this happens in 92.2% of the councils.
29Under citizen-candidate models, such as Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), voters care
about candidate quality as this will result in the implementation of better policies. One interpretation is that the
probability that a candidate solves a problem that benefits voters is increasing in her competence.
30For simplicity, we assume that every voter has the same bias. We could instead have different biases for male and
female voters, or a distribution of biases. As long as the bias, or its distribution, is orthogonal to the distribution of
ideology, results are not affected.
31Since we have only one group of voters, this distribution, which renders the probability of winning a voter’s
support a continuous function of the candidate’s characteristics, becomes irrelevant. Thus, we do not need to specify
it.
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32In section 5.1, we show evidence that voters care significantly more about the competence and gender of the
top-listed candidate relative to those of other candidates. Here, for tractability, we assume that they care only about
the quality and gender of the top-listed candidate. For a formal analysis, see appendix A.
which is also assumed to be uniformly distributed, δ ∼ U [− 1ψ , 1ψ ], with ψ > 0.
With these assumptions, and considering a vote restricted to take place only between A1 and
B1, the probability that party A wins is given by (see appendix A for derivation):
PA =
1
2
+ ψ
(
sA1 − sB1 − μ( g(A1)=f − g(B1)=f )
)
. (3)
Given that the mayor will implement policy and that only top-listed candidates can be elected
mayors in CL, voters will only care about the quality and gender of top-listed candidates in CL.32
Under this assumption, equation (3) gives the probability that party A wins the election under the
CL system.
In OL, we assume that voters first rank candidates in each party such that the candidate ranked
first for party i is the one with highest value for competence net of gender bias. Then a pairwise
comparison of the highest ranked candidates for both parties, A1 and B1, is made, and the first
vote is cast for the candidate that gives the voter the higher utility according to (1) and (2). To
cast the second vote, the voter now compares the second ranked candidate of the party that got
her first vote with the highest ranked candidate of the other party, i.e. a comparison of either A2
and B1, or B2 and A1. Again the vote is cast to the candidate that gives the voter the higher
utility according to (1) and (2). The three most voted candidates are elected and the party that
gets both of its candidates elected chooses the mayor among them. Importantly, since voters only
imperfectly observe candidate competence, and thus do not know ex ante which candidate will be
chosen as mayor, they will express a gender bias when casting both votes in the OL system. This
stands in contrast to the CL system, where only the gender of the top-listed candidate matters, as
only this candidate can eventually be appointed mayor.
We assume that parties are office motivated and might also have a bias against women. In CL,
given that only top-listed candidates can be elected mayors, we assume that party j maximizes
U jCL = P j − νψ g(j1)=f ,
where νψ ≥ 0 is the cost to parties, relative to the rents from office, of choosing a female candidate
for mayor.
In OL, by contrast, any councilor can be elected mayor. Thus, we have to characterize the
mayor selection process. We follow Fujiwara and Sanz (2018) in assuming that elections serve the
purpose of aggregating information. Thus, election outcomes in the OL system inform voters on
the quality of the candidates. As a result, voters have a preference that the most voted candidate
of the party with two councilors (as opposed to the second most voted candidate of that party)
is appointed mayor. But parties are not constrained in this choice, creating a potential conflict of
interest between them and voters. The latter thus have a reason to punish, in the next election, a
party that does not select their currently preferred candidate. Thus, we assume that the objective
function of parties in OL has an extra term capturing the future expected consequences of the
current mayor choice:
U jOL = P j − νψ g(ma(j))=f − βψ ma(j)=j2
[
1− μα g(j1)=f
]
, (4)
where ma(j) denotes party j’s choice of mayor, ma(j)=j2 is an indicator function that takes the
value of 1 when the party chooses as mayor the second most voted candidate, and βψ ≥ 0 is the
cost, in terms of future election prospects relative to current rents in office, of not choosing the
most voted candidate as mayor in the OL system.33 Note that we allow for gender differences in
33For simplicity, we assume that imperfect information on candidates’ competence does not affect their relative
ranking in the vote tally, i.e. j1 will get more votes than j2.
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3.2 Analytical Results
We start by evaluating the predictions of the model regarding the electoral impact of having female
(as opposed to male) candidates. For the CL system, we study the impact of having a woman, as
opposed to a man, as the candidate for mayor, i.e. as the top-listed candidate. Equation (3) gives
the probability that a party wins an election, conditional on the competence and gender of the
competing candidates. Therefore, if party A is contemplating replacing m1 with f1 as its candidate
for mayor, this has an effect on its vote share that is proportional to:
PA|f1 − PA|m1 = ψ
(
sf1 − sm1 − μ
)
.
The effect of replacing a male by a female candidate on the electoral prospects in OL is derived
similarly using (15), the equivalent of (3). We find that if party A is contemplating replacing, say,
m1 with f2 as a candidate, this has an effect on its vote share proportional to:
PA|f1, f2 − PA|f1,m1 = ψ
2
(
sf2 − sm1 − μ
)
.
We summarize these result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If there is voter bias against women (μ > 0), then having a female candidate for
mayor in CL (female candidates in OL) reduces the party’s vote share, conditional on candidates’
competence.
To evaluate the effect of the electoral system on the share of female candidates, councilors, and
mayors, we specify how the supply of candidates is determined. Candidates’ competence is assumed
to be distributed according to H(·).34 Denote by m1 and m2 < m1 (respectively f1 and f2 < f1)
the two competence draws for male (female) candidates from this distribution for a given party. We
denote by H1 (H2) the probability distribution for the maximum (minimum) of two independent
draws. The probability that the party chooses a female candidate for mayor under the CL system
is given by
P (f1 > m1 + μ+ ν) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
m1+μ+ν
dH1(f1)dH1(m1)
=
∫ ∞
0
(1−H1(m1 + μ+ ν)) dH1(m1)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
H1(m1 + μ+ ν)dH1(m1).
Since H1(·) is an increasing function, the probability of choosing a female candidate is decreasing
with voter and party bias against women.
34We only impose minor restrictions on this distribution function, namely, that it has a compact support and no
mass points. Furthermore, these properties should be inherited by the distributions of the maximum and minimum
of two independent draws.
β [1− μα] < ν.
the norm, i.e. that the norm may be enforced differently depending on whether the most voted
candidate is a male or female. For the former, the relative cost is βψ, while for the latter, it is
βψ(1 − μα). Thus, voter bias reduces the cost of not selecting the most voted candidate if this
happens to be female.
Hence, the model assumes that, if both candidates are of the same gender, then the most voted
one will be selected as mayor to avoid punishment in future elections. The same happens if the
most voted candidate is male and the second most voted candidate is female. But if the most voted
candidate is female and the second most voted candidate is male, then the party will select the
male candidate as mayor if and only if
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In the CL system, we assume that the party will choose the most competent candidate, among
the remaining three draws, for the second place in the list.35 Denoting by F the number of female
candidates, the probabilities that the party chooses none, PCL(F = 0), or two, PCL(F = 2), female
candidates are given by36
PCL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m1 + μ+ ν ∧ f1 < m2) = P (f1 < m2), (5)
PCL(F = 2) = P (f1 > m1 + μ+ ν ∧ f2 > m1) = P (m1 < min[f2, f1 − μ− ν]), (6)
35Recall that, in CL, voters care only about competence and gender of top-listed candidates. We assume that
parties follow this convention to reward competent candidates, and preserve them for future elections.
36The expressions below involve integrals of dH1 and dH2 as in the derivation of P (f1 > m1 + μ+ ν) above.
and the probability of one female candidate is PCL(F = 1) = 1 − PCL(F = 0) − PCL(F = 2).
Equations (5) and (6) show that, in CL, parties may have a bias against having a female candidate
for mayor, and also internalize voter bias when comparing f1 and m1, but there is no bias for the
second placed candidate.
In the OL system, parties choose candidates taking into consideration voter gender bias for both
candidates and that the ex post mayor selection might entail a cost if the most voted candidate is
female and the party selects the male second most voted candidate. Thus,37
POL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m2 + μ+ 2 f1>m1+μmin[ν, β(1− μα)])
= P (f1 < m2 + μ) + P (m1 + μ < f1 < m2 + μ+ 2min[ν, β(1− μα)]), (7)
POL(F = 2) = P (f2 > m1 + μ+ 2ν − 2min[ν, β(1− μα)]), (8)
where f1>m1+μ is an indicator for whether the highest ranked female candidate would get more
votes than the highest ranked male candidate. Parties, when comparing the most competent
candidates, know that choosing one female and one male candidates gives them the option of later
selecting the male if he finishes second.38 The probability of one female candidate, POL(F = 1),
is given by 1 − POL(F = 0) − POL(F = 2). The difference in the expected number of female
candidates across electoral systems is given by
E[F ]CL − E[F ]OL = PCL(F = 1) + 2PCL(F = 2)− [POL(F = 1) + 2POL(F = 2)] ,
=
[
POL(F = 0)− PCL(F = 0)]+ [PCL(F = 2)− POL(F = 2)] .
Proposition 2. If there is voter bias against women (μ > 0) and no party bias (ν = 0), then the
CL system increases the expected share of female candidates (E[F ]CL − E[F ]OL > 0). If there is
party bias (ν > 0), no voter bias (μ = 0), ν < β, and ν << 1, then the expected share of female
candidates is approximately the same under both electoral systems (E[F ]CL ≈ E[F ]OL). If there is
party bias (ν > 0), no voter bias (μ = 0), and ν >> E[f1] − E[f2], then the CL system increases
the expected share of female candidates (E[F ]CL − E[F ]OL > 0).
Proof. See appendix B.
To determine the effect of the electoral system on the share of female councilors, we need to
combine the results of propositions 1 and 2, as a party’s electoral performance determines whether
it gets one or two councilors, and performance depends on candidates’ competence and gender.
37The following expressions come from the comparison of objective function (4) for the three possible cases, choosing
both male candidates, both female, or a male and a female. Taking into account the probability of wining the election
(equation 15), these options have the following values for parties:
m1 +m2,
f1 + f2 − 2ν − 2μ,
f1 +m1 − μ− 2 f1>m1+μ min[ν, β(1− αμ)],
where the indicator f1>m1+μ shows that when the female candidate will get fewer votes than the male candidate,
the party can chose the male candidate as mayor with no cost.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1834
The case of voter bias will be explored with numerical simulations. For the case of party bias, but
no voter bias, candidates’ gender has no effect on vote shares. Proposition 2 shows that, for low
values of party bias, such that ν < β, the share of female candidates is the same across electoral
systems. This does not imply that the share of female councilors is the same in CL and OL, because
in the former there will be less female top-listed candidates due to party bias. Since only top-listed
candidates become councilors for the losing party, this implies that the share of female councilors
is lower in CL.
Proposition 3. If there is party bias against women (ν > 0), no voter bias (μ = 0), ν < β, and
ν << 1, then the OL system increases the expected share of female councilors.
Finally, we study the model’s implications for the share of female mayors. We start by recalling
that the probability that a party chooses a female candidate for mayor in CL is given by
PCL(g(ma(j)) = f) = P (f1 > m1 + μ+ ν). (9)
The analysis is again complicated since the probability of having a female mayor also depends on
the probability that a party that chooses a female candidate for mayor wins the election, E[P j |f1 >
m1 + μ+ ν].
Proposition 4. If there is voter bias against women (μ > 0), no party bias (ν = 0), and β(1−αμ) >
ν = 0, then the expected share of female mayors is approximately the same under the two systems.
If there is party bias (ν > 0), no voter bias (μ = 0), and ν < β, then the expected share of female
mayors is higher under the OL system. If there is party bias (ν > 0), no voter bias (μ = 0), and
ν > β, then the expected share of female mayors is higher under the CL system.
Proof. See appendix B.
3.3 Numerical Simulations
To complete the analytical predictions provided so far, we resort to numerical simulations (for
details see appendix C). In the simulations, we make β and α stochastic such that, in equilibrium,
there is variation in the degree with which the norm is followed when the most voted candidate is
female. Figure 1 shows the results of these simulations, both for voter bias (panel A), and party
bias (panel B). Three different strengths for the norm are considered, “strong” when the probability
that a woman is not appointed mayor after winning the popular vote is low, “intermediate” when
this probability is approximately 15%, and “weak” when it is around 30%. Results confirm the
predictions of propositions 2, 3, and 4.
In panel A, it can be seen that in the presence of voter bias and no party bias, the CL system
leads to a higher share of female candidates and councilors than the OL system, and the gap is
increasing in voter bias. These effects are very similar in the three graphs of Panel A, indicating
that they do not depend on the strength of the norm. The CL system also increases the share of
female mayors. This effect is, as expected, very sensitive to the strength of the norm.
Panel B of figure 1 considers the case of party bias when there is no voter bias. For low values
of party bias, the two systems result in approximately the same share of female candidates, and, as
party bias increases, CL results in relatively more female candidates. In contrast, for low values of
party bias, the CL system leads to fewer female councilors than the OL system. Finally, the effect
on the share of female mayors depends on the strength of the norm. If the norm is strong, then the
OL system increases the share of female mayors. If the norm is weak or intermediate, CL results
in a higher share of female mayors than OL.
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4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we empirically estimate the effect of the electoral system on the share of female
candidates, councilors, and mayors. Section 4.1 lays out the data used in the regressions, section
4.2 presents the empirical strategy, and section 4.3 shows the results.
4.1 Data
Data for municipal elections are from the Ministry of the Interior and are publicly available. Infor-
mation on the gender of candidates, councilors, and mayors can be obtained for four election-years:
2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. For municipalities in the OL system and for those in the CL system in
2003, we imputed the gender from the first name. Names in Spain are strongly gender-oriented, so
ambiguous cases are extremely rare (this approach has been used by previous work, e.g. Casas-Arce
and Saiz (2015) and Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012)). Additionally, we use data from national
Congress elections (also from the Ministry of Interior) and some demographic variables (from the
National Institute of Statistics) to assess covariate balance around the threshold. These data are
also publicly available.
We focus on municipalities close to the threshold, which we define as those within a window
of 150 inhabitants around the cutoff, that is, from 100 to 400 inhabitants.39 The final data set
contains observations for 9,465 municipal elections.40
Table 1 shows the share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors, by year (panel A) and
by electoral system (panel B). On average, 24.9% of candidates, 21.7% of councilors, and 15.3%
of mayors were female. Three things are worth noting. First, women are more present among
candidates than among councilors and mayors. This is because women are ranked lower in the
lists (in CL), or because they receive fewer votes than male candidates (in OL).41 Second, women’s
representation has increased significantly over the sample period. For instance, the share of female
candidates rose from 20.8% in 2003 to 27.6% in 2015. Third, women are more represented in
the CL than in the OL system. This prima facie evidence might suggest that the CL system
increases women’s representation, but should not be interpreted causally at this stage, as it is a
mere comparison of means.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We implement a RD design to estimate the effect of the electoral system on the share of female
candidates, councilors, and mayors:
Outcomemt = α+ χCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) + umt, (10)
where Outcomemt is the outcome of interest (e.g., the share of female candidates), CLmt is a
treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 if municipality m used the CL system in election-year
t, Popmt is the assignment variable (population the year before the elections), and umt is an error
term. The parameter of interest is χ.
39It is natural to consider 150 as the window of analysis because there is a change in the government system at
100 inhabitants, as explained in Section 2.
40This is 97.4% of all the potential observations. The remaining are cases with missing or erroneous data in the
original files, or in which we cannot identify the gender of one or more candidates or councilors.
41Note that the position a person within the list can also affect the votes that one gets in the OL system: voters
tend to vote for candidates that are at the top of the list—see Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012).
The identification assumption is that municipalities at both sides of the threshold do not differ in
characteristics, other than the electoral system, that may affect women’s representation in politics.
We assess the validity of the empirical approach with two tests that are standard in RD designs.
First, we show that there is no manipulation around the threshold. If having a population size
just above or just below the threshold is as good as random, then the density of populations should
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be continuous near the threshold. We implement the test introduced by Cattaneo, Jansson, and
Ma (2017) and cannot reject the null of no manipulation (p-value = 0.39), as shown in figure 2.42
Second, we show that covariates are balanced around the threshold. We study whether mu-
nicipalities at both sides of the threshold are similar in a number of socioeconomic and political
characteristics: average age of the population, share of foreigners and EU foreigners, a measure
of the ideology (the difference in votes shares in the last Congress election before election-year t
between the two main parties, the right-wing Popular Party (PP) and the left-wing Socialist Party
(PSOE)), voter turnout, and unemployment rate. We also study whether the observations at both
sides of the threshold are equally likely to come from any given year. As mentioned, women’s repre-
sentation has been increasing over our sample period. If our CL observations are from more recent
years than those from OL, that could spuriously drive our results. Hence, if the empirical strategy
is valid, we should find that the electoral system is not correlated with any of these variables. The
results, displayed in table 2 and figure 3, show that all of the coefficients are close to zero and not
statistically significant at any conventional level.
4.3 Results
Table 3 presents the main estimates of the impact of the electoral system on the share of female
candidates, councilors, and mayors. Column (1) provides the estimated effect with a linear poly-
nomial and the bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (2) shows the
results when the bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) is employed. Columns (3)
and (4) use the entire sample with linear and quadratic specifications. Column (5) uses the local
randomization strategy introduced by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015).43 Results for a
wide range of bandwidths are shown in figure A1.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the effect of the electoral system on candidates. The CL system
increases the share of female candidates by between 2 and 3 p.p. (8-12%). This effect is significant
at conventional levels. A graphical representation of the results can be seen in panel A of figure 4.
Panel B of table 3 and panel B of figure 4 show the results for councilors. The CL system increases
the share of female councilors by between 2 and 3 p.p. (9-14%). This effect is also statistically
significant. Finally, Panel C of table 3 and panel C of figure 4 show the effect on mayors. The
results indicate that the CL system increases the share of female mayors by between 3.5 and 6 p.p
(22-37%). The estimates are noisier than those for candidates and councilors, but significant in
most specifications. An inspection to panel C of figure A1 also reveals estimates within this range
for a large set of bandwidths, suggesting that the CL system does increase the share of female
mayors.
42This is in contrast to Sanz (2017b). Note, however, that our paper focuses on the final years of the period, so
the samples are different. In particular, there is evidence that manipulation of population figures almost disappeared
after 2005, due to an improvement in the enforcement of population numbers by the Statistics Agency (Foremny and
Sole´-Olle´ (2016)).
43To calculate the window, we use all of the covariates listed in table 2. We start from the possible smallest
window (size 1) and study 10 10-inhabitant increments. The resulting window is 31 inhabitants. Note that, under
local randomization, one derives the exact distribution of the statistic in the randomization of the treatment. This
distribution is exact and need not be symmetric, and hence standard errors are not defined. For this reason, we
report the p-values in this column.
In sum, the evidence indicates that the CL system increases the share of female candidates,
councilors, and mayors. According to the model, these results are likely driven by voter bias, as
(moderate) party bias has the counterfactual implication that we should observe a higher share of
female councilors in OL than in CL. According to the numerical simulations reported in figure 1,
voter bias of between 0.03 and 0.05 can account for the observed difference in female candidates
and councilors between the two electoral systems.44 For these values of voter bias to also account
for the observed differences in the share of female mayors, it must be the case that the norm for
44The average competence of a candidate is normalized to be one. For the Pareto distribution used, the average
competence of two independent draws is roughly 1.61. Thus, voter bias of between 0.03 and 0.05 corresponds to voter
bias of between 1.8% and 3.1% of the average competence of the highest-ranked female candidate.
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mayor selection is not followed with probability between 15% and 30% when a female candidate
wins the popular vote. In the next section, we will provide some additional results that support
the presence of voter bias in our context and back the mechanism of the model.
5 Additional Results
In this section, we provide additional results that lend support to the mechanism of the model. In
Section 5.1, we (i) show that female candidates attract fewer votes than male candidates, suggesting
the presence of voter bias; (ii) identify a subsample of municipalities—those that have been exposed
to a female mayor in the past—in which female and male candidates attract the same votes; and
(iii) provide support for the assumption of the model that, in the CL system, the gender and quality
of the top-listed candidate are more relevant than those of lower-ranked candidates. In Section 5.2,
we study the mayor selection in the OL system, and provide evidence that (i) as posited in the
model, there is a norm that the councilor with most general election votes should become mayor;
(ii) there are gender differences in this norm; and (iii) voters enforce the norm and its gender
differences, further suggesting the presence of voter bias against women. In Section 5.3, we test an
additional prediction of the model, namely, that in the absence of voter and party bias, the two
systems should result in the same share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors. We provide
evidence that is consistent with this prediction, by showing that the effect of CL is not present in
the subsample of municipalities that have been exposed to a female mayor.
5.1 The Gender of Candidates and Vote Shares
In CL, we estimate the effect of the gender of the top-listed candidate (i.e. the candidate for mayor)
on the votes received by the party-list:
V Shpmt = γ(pt) + γ(m) + θfemFemCandidate1,pmt + θexpExpCandidate1,pmt + pmt, (11)
where V Shpmt is the vote share of party p in municipality m and election-year t, FemCandidate1
is a dummy that indicates whether party p’s top-listed candidate is female, and ExpCandidate1,pmt
is a dummy that indicates whether the top-listed candidate has been a councilor in the past.45. To
avoid incumbency effects, we restrict the sample to non-incumbent parties.46 In OL, we estimate
the same regression, but the unit of observation is an individual candidate (instead of a party), i.e.
45Other papers have used experience as a proxy for competence (Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) and Galasso
and Nannicini (2017)). Another obvious option is education, but unfortunately we do not observe the education of
candidates.
46The results of these tests are very similar if we consider the outcome in differences (V Shpmt−V Shpmt−4) instead
of levels, or if we consider a (less demanding) specification with separate party and time fixed effects, i.e. γ(p) + γ(t)
instead of γ(pt).
we regress the vote share of a candidate on that candidate’s gender and experience and the fixed
effects.
Table 4 shows the results. In column (1), which does not include the experience control, we can
see that having a female candidate for mayor in CL reduces the party’s vote share by 3.8 p.p (panel
A). In OL, a female candidate is expected to obtain 2 p.p. less than a male counterpart (column
(1) of panel B). Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (2) adds the
experience control. The coefficients are slightly reduced compared with the unconditional results
shown in column (1), but remain negative and significant at the 1% level, both in CL (panel A) and
OL (panel B). As expected, the results also show that experienced candidates command a larger
share of votes. Hence, according to proposition 1, these results suggest the presence of voter bias.47
We then split the sample based on whether the municipality has had a female mayor at any point
during the two previous terms.48 We expect that biases against women are lower in municipalities
that have been exposed to a female mayor, for two reasons: (i) the fact that a female was elected
47Of course, they should be interpreted with caution, given that experience is a crude measure of competence.
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48We focus on the last two terms (8 years) to avoid including exposition that is very distant in the past. The
results are, in any case, very similar if we split the sample based on having been exposed to a female mayor at any
point in the past.
49Having a female mayor can also reduce party bias, if the mayor is sufficiently powerful in the relevant party
structure, i.e. in the provincial or regional power structure behind candidate choices.
50In 97.5% of the OL elections, one party has a majority in the council.
mayor indicates that they probably were municipalities with initially low voter and party biases, and
(ii) having been exposed to a female mayor can lower voter bias (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo,
Pande, and Topalova (2009)).49 Consistent with our hypothesis, the negative effect of women
candidates on vote shares is larger in non-exposed municipalities (column (3) of table 4) and is not
present in exposed municipalities (column (4)). This pattern occurs in both CL (panel A) and OL
(panel B). We will make use of this subsample division in section 5.3, to test the model’s prediction
that there should be no effect of the electoral system in municipalities with no bias against women.
Finally, we provide evidence that backs the model assumption that, in CL, voters only care
about the gender and experience of the top-listed candidate (or that they care substantially more
than about the gender and experience of the rest of the candidates in the list). In column (5) of
panel A, we add to equation (11) the variables FemCand2−7,pmt and ExpCand2−7,pmt, the gender
and experience of candidates ranked in positions 2 to 7 of the party-lists. If the model’s assumption
is correct, the effect of FemCand1,pmt and ExpCand1,pmt should be substantially larger than those
of FemCand2−7,pmt and ExpCand2−7,pmt. The results support this assumption. While having a
woman as the top-listed candidate reduces the vote share of the list by 3 p.p., this effect is 0.8 p.p.
for a candidate ranked lower in the list. For experience, the effect is also larger for the top-listed
candidate than for other candidates, although the gap is smaller (7 versus 5.7 p.p.).
5.2 Mayor Selection in OL
We begin by providing evidence that, as assumed in our model, there is a norm that the councilor
that obtained the most votes in the general election is substantially more likely to be appointed
mayor than the runner-up, even when the two councilors almost tied in votes. Intuitively, we
want to compare the two most voted councilors in the list of the party that appointed the mayor,
and estimate whether the one with more votes is more likely to become the mayor. For example,
consider an election in which one party has three councilors and another party has two—hence,
the decision of whom to appoint mayor corresponds in practice to the councilors of the party with
three councilors.50 The general-election votes for the councilors of this party were 50, 49, and 35.
We want to compare the probability that the councilors with 50 and 49 votes are appointed mayor.
Given that obtaining one more vote is essentially random, the two councilors with 50 and 49 votes
should be, on average, equal in any other characteristic (education, quality, gender, etc.). Hence,
if the councilor with 50 votes is more likely to become mayor, this identifies a norm that “the most
voted councilor has to become mayor”.51
We use RD to estimate the effects, following the empirical strategy of Fujiwara and Sanz (2018).
We define the running variable as follows:
xcmt =
{
vmt if c is the most voted
−vmt if c is second most voted,
(12)
where c refers to a councilor of the party of the mayor, and vmt is the difference in general-election
votes between the first and second most voted councilors of the party that appointed the mayor in
period t.
Therefore, for each election, we have two observations, one for the most voted councilor of the
party of the mayor, and another for the second most voted councilor. If xcmt > 0, then councilor c
51There is a provision in the law that stipulates that, if no councilor obtains the majority of the votes in the
mayor selection in the council, then the councilor with the most general-election votes is appointed mayor by default.
We believe that this is unlikely to explain the effect—see the discussion in Fujiwara and Sanz (2018) as to why a
similar provision in their context cannot explain outcomes. Furthermore, this provision of the law obviously does not
differentiate by gender and hence cannot explain the gender differences that we identify.
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has the most votes (First), and it has the second most votes otherwise. Let ycmt be the outcome,
that is, becoming the mayor. The effect of having most votes is given by limxcmt↓0 E[ycmt|xcmt] −
limxcmt↑0 E[ycmt|xcmt], which can be estimated with a RD design:
ycmt = θ0 + θ1First+ f(xcmt) + cmt. (13)
The identification assumption is that barely being the first or second most voted councilor
does not correlate with any other factor that affects whether that councilor is appointed mayor.
Intuitively, we are comparing two councilors of the same party, one of which obtained just one
more vote than the other. As long as the number of votes that candidates are going to obtain
cannot be precisely controlled, obtaining one more or less vote should be as good as random and
the identification assumption is likely to hold. In particular, the two most voted councilors of the
mayor’s party should be equal in any characteristics.52 As a validity check, we show in figure A2
that the first and second most voted councilors are in fact equally likely to be female. Also note
that, by design, all covariates that do not vary within a municipality-year are balanced, and that
the standard errors are not affected by the double-counting of elections, as they are clustered by
municipality (see Fujiwara and Sanz (2018) for more details on the identification approach).53
The results from estimating equation (13) are in column (1) of table 5 and displayed graphically
in figure 5.54 When the two most voted councilors in the mayor’s party-list almost tie in votes, the
52One issue that can affect the votes obtained by candidates in the OL system is their position within the party-list,
as there is evidence that voters tend to vote more for candidates that appear higher in the list (e.g. Esteve-Volart and
Bagues (2012) show this happens in elections to the Spanish Senate). We cannot observe the positions of candidates
within party-lists but this should also be balanced near the threshold and not drive the results. The logic is the same
as for any predetermined characteristic. If obtaining one more or fewer votes is essentially random, the candidate
that obtained one more votes than the other should be, on average, equally likely to be the candidate placed at the
top of the list.
53To avoid incumbency effects, we restrict the sample to non-incumbent parties, i.e. we only consider mayor
selection by those parties that were not in office in the previous period. The results are very similar if we do not
make this restriction.
54These results are based on the IK bandwidth, but are robust to other bandwidth choices, as can be seen in figure
A3.
most voted councilor is 18.6 p.p. more likely to be appointed mayor than the second most voted
councilor. The remaining columns of table 5 (and panels b-e of figure 5) study gender differences
in the norm, by splitting the sample depending on the gender of the two most voted councilors.
They reveal significant differences: the norm is strongest when the second most voted candidate is
female, and weakest (non-existent) when the first is female and the second male. In appendix D,
we provide an additional test of the gender differences in this norm.
We now turn to investigate the mechanism behind the norm (and its gender differences). We
can think of two potential explanations. The first is that the norm arises from an agreement within
parties to save bargaining costs. Every time a party gets a majority in the council, it needs to decide
which of its councilors to appoint as mayor. Having the norm that “the most voted councilor is
appointed mayor” can facilitate the decision process. If parties are biased against women, this
could also account for the gender differences in the norm. The second potential explanation is
that the norm is enforced by voters. Fujiwara and Sanz (2018) provide evidence that, in a variety
of contexts, voters think that it is more “democratic” or “fair” that the most voted party forms
the government. They also develop a model that shows that such norm can maximize welfare.
As discussed in section 3, a norm that the most voted councilor is appointed mayor would also
maximize welfare in our context, as the most voted councilor is expected to be of higher quality
than the second most voted.
Although we cannot rule out that the first explanation is at play to some degree, we argue that
the latter explanation is most likely. First, Fujiwara and Sanz (2018) provide compelling evidence
that voters enforce a similar norm, also in Spain, by punishing in the next election parties that
break the norm. It is reasonable to think that a similar norm in the same country is also enforced
by voters. Second, and more importantly, we do a similar analysis and find that voters also punish
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1834
55In OL, voters do not vote directly for a party, so it is not obvious how to aggregate votes by party. We follow the
formula established in the Spanish Electoral Law to measure the strength of parties in municipal elections. According
to this formula, which was created to allocate seats to parties in province governments, votes for a party are obtained
as the average of the votes obtained by the individual candidates of that party, up to a maximum of four.
parties that break the norm in our context. In particular, we test how the vote share of a party
that follows the norm evolves in the next election compared with a party that breaks the norm:
V Shmt+4 − V Shmt = γ(p) + γ(m) + γ(t) + φNormmt + ξNorm ∗GenderDiffmt + mt, (14)
where V Shpmt is the vote share of the party that appointed the mayor in municipality m in
election-year t, Normmt is a dummy that indicates whether the norm is followed in the mayor
selection—that is, it takes the value of 1 if the most voted councilor of the party of the mayor is
appointed mayor and 0 otherwise—and γ(p), γ(m), and γ(t) are party, municipality and election-
year fixed effects.55 The sample is restricted to municipalities in which the party did not have
the mayor at the previous term (i.e., time t − 4), to avoid incumbency effects. The coefficient φ
captures how following the norm in the mayor selection benefits the incumbent in the next election.
Note that gaining votes from following the norm is equivalent to losing votes for not following the
norm—we can only estimate the difference between following and not following the norm. If voters
enforce the norm, we expect φ to be positive.
To study whether gender differences in the norm are also enforced by voters, we add the control
Norm∗GenderDiff, where GenderDiff is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the most voted
councilor was female and the second was male, 0 if they were of the same gender, and -1 if the
most voted was male and the second was female. Hence, when this control is added, the coefficient
on Norm, φ, measures whether voters punish parties that do not follow the norm in cases in which
the two most voted councilors are of the same gender, and the coefficient on Norm∗GenderDiff, ξ,
captures whether punishment is different when the top two councilors are of different gender. In
particular, if voters drive the gender differential effects, then ξ should be negative.
The results are shown in table 6. In column (1), which does not include party fixed effects, we
see that parties that follow the norm gain 7.5 p.p. more votes in the next election compared with
those that break the norm. In column (2), where we add party fixed effects, the effect remains
similar (6.5 p.p.) and significant at the 5% level. Column (3) studies gender differences in the
enforcement of the norm. The coefficient on Norm is 7.3 p.p., which indicates that, when a party
follows the norm and the two most voted councilors were of the same gender, in the next election
the party gains 7.3 p.p. in vote share. The coefficient on Norm∗GenderDiff is -7.8 p.p., indicating
that the gain from following the norm disappears completely when the most voted was female and
the second was male. Column (4) shows that these results are robust to including party fixed
effects. Finally, column (5) performs a placebo test, in which we show that there is no effect of the
norm on the lagged outcome variable—that is, parties that follow the norm have obtained a similar
vote share in the time t election than those who break the norm. Hence, these results support that
voters enforce the norm and its gender differences.
5.3 Effect of the Electoral System by Previous Exposure to a Female Mayor
The model predicts that, in the absence of voter and party biases, the two electoral systems should
result in the same share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors. Here we test this prediction.
As shown in section 5.1, women attract, on average, fewer votes than men, but this is not the case in
municipalities that have been exposed to a female mayor, suggesting that there is no (voter or party)
bias against women in these municipalities. Hence, we split the sample by exposure to a female
mayor and run equation (10) separately in the two subsamples. Under the model’s assumptions, we
should see that the positive effect of CL on the share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors
is not present in the subsample of exposed municipalities.
The results are in table 7 (also see figure 6). For candidates (panel A), CL increases the share
of female candidates by between 3.5 p.p. and 4.5 p.p. in non-exposed municipalities. In exposed
municipalities, by contrast, the point estimates of CL are smaller and non-significant in most
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specifications. We can reject that the coefficients in exposed and non-exposed municipalities are
equal at the 1% level. For councilors (panel B), CL increases women’s representation by between 3.7
p.p. and 4.3 p.p. in non-exposed municipalities. In exposed municipalities, there is no significant
effect of the electoral system. We can reject the null that the coefficients in exposed and non-
exposed coefficients are equal, at the 5% level. Finally, the point estimates for mayors (panel C)
are considerably larger in exposed municipalities, contrary to what we expected. There are two
reasons that can explain this apparently surprising result. First, these coefficients are very noisily
estimated, so it is hard to draw strong conclusions. In fact, the coefficients in the subsample of
exposed municipalities, although quantitatively large, are non-significant in most specifications, and
we cannot reject the null that the estimates are equal in the exposed and non-exposed subsamples.
Second, the percent (as opposed to percentage points) effect of CL is substantially lower in exposed
municipalities compared with non-exposed municipalities.56
56For example, based on the IK estimation of column (1), the percent effect is 21% (=11.3/54.4) in exposed
municipalities, and 56% (=3.5/6.2) in non-exposed municipalities.
6 Other Possible Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss three alternative explanations to our findings. First, the CL system
could increase the share of women because of its larger district magnitude. Our model relies on
the different ballot structure of the two electoral systems. However, there is also a difference in
the district magnitude: seven councilors are elected in CL, and five in OL. It has been argued
that larger district magnitudes lead to more women’s representation (Matland and Brown 1992).
A possible reason is that more seats make “ticket balancing” easier. Political parties want to put
some men at the top of the list, and then balance the list with females at the bottom (if there
is room for them). Therefore, the longer the list is (the larger the district magnitude) the easier
it is for parties to balance their tickets. As the CL system has the larger district magnitude, it
should make it easier for parties to include more women. However, note that, while this mechanism
might explain the effect on candidates or councilors, it cannot account for the effect on mayors.
Furthermore, this mechanism cannot explain why the effect of CL disappears in municipalities with
low or no bias against women. Finally, and more importantly, we exploit the fact that, at 1,000
inhabitants, there is another threshold in which there is a change in district magnitude but not in
the ballot structure. Municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (and more than 250) elect
seven councilors, while those with 1,000 or more inhabitants elect nine councilors—hence, they
both use the CL system but with different district magnitudes. We perform an analysis in this
threshold using the same empirical strategy as for the 250-inhabitant threshold. The results from
these tests, displayed in table 8 and figure 7, reveal no effect of the district magnitude on the share
of candidates, councilors, or mayors.57
Second, the effects might be driven by a supply component. The literature has discussed three
main reasons behind women’s underrepresentation in politics: voter bias, party bias, and supply
reasons, i.e. women’s (un)willingness to participate in politics. While the results in our paper
suggest that voter bias is more relevant than party bias, we cannot say anything about the strength
of voter bias relative to the supply component. In fact, it is very likely that there is a supply
component at play. In particular, note that the share of women is substantially below 50%, and it
is hard for voter (or party) bias to explain such low levels. A different question is whether a supply
mechanism can drive the difference in women’s representation between the two electoral systems.
For this to happen, it is not sufficient that there is a supply component at play, but this supply
component must also differ by electoral system. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we believe
that it cannot drive the entirety of the effect. First of all, there is no obvious reason why women’s
57Figure A4 shows that there is no manipulation of the running variable around this threshold (p-value=0.63), and
table A1 shows that covariates are balanced.
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willingness to participate should be different in OL and CL.58 Furthermore, a supply component
cannot directly explain why the effect disappears in the subsample of exposed municipalities.
Third, the two electoral systems might lead to different party structures, and this in turn have
an impact on women’s presence. For example, if one electoral system favors left-wing parties, and
left-wing parties include more women in their lists, this system could end up with a higher share
of female candidates. To shed light on this mechanism, we conduct two tests. First, we study
whether the electoral system affects which party the mayor belongs to. We estimate equation (10)
with the party of the mayor as the dependent variable. Table A2 and figure A5 show the results
58One such possible reason is that the OL system leads to a more aggressive or competitive campaign. If women
shy away from competition, then women might be less interested in running in OL. But, if this were the case, we
should see no difference in the share of female mayors between the two electoral systems: given that, in CL, the mayor
candidate has more visibility and campaign responsibilities, women should shy away from being mayor candidates in
this system.
of these tests. There is no evidence that the electoral system affects which party is in office: the
point estimates of CL are very close to zero and are not statistically significant. Second, we test
whether the share of female candidates, councilors, and mayors is different in the two systems, for
a given party. The results are shown in table A3 and figure A6. There is no heterogeneity in the
effect for candidates and councilors: the two main parties, the PP and the PSOE, both include a
higher share of women candidates, and have a higher share of women among their councilors in
CL. For mayors, the point estimate is much larger for the PP, but the results are imprecise and not
statistically significant for any party.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a flexible model to estimate the effects of voter and party gender biases on
candidate choice and mayor selection, and thus on observed female representation across electoral
systems. The model assumes that candidates are in limited supply, and that voters care about
the gender and competence of candidates and about party ideology. Preferences are aggregated
through probabilistic voting. Parties choose candidates to maximize their probability of winning
an election aware of voter bias, and possibly subject to party bias. The model has stark predictions
on how voter and party biases affect female representation across two electoral systems, an OL
system in which voters choose candidates from all lists, and a CL system in which voters choose
an entire list of candidates.
We have used the context of Spanish municipal elections to test the model predictions. Given
that the electoral system is determined by population size as mandated by national law, RD provides
credible estimates of causal effects. Our regressions show that the CL system increases the share
of female candidates and councilors by between 2 and 3 p.p., and the share of female mayors by
between 3.5 and 6 p.p. Our model explains these results as mostly driven by average voter bias
against women. We have provided additional evidence that supports the mechanism of the model:
women attract fewer votes than men; there is a norm that the most voted should be appointed
mayor in the OL system, and there are gender differences in this norm, which are enforced by
voters; and the differences in women’s representation between CL and OL are not present in a
subsample of municipalities in which there is arguably less bias against women.
Our paper studies the effect of the electoral system on both directly- and indirectly-elected
offices, i.e., councilors and mayors, respectively. Much of the work on women’s representation is
about elected offices, but the evidence on selected executive posts is scarce and mixed. For example,
regarding the effects of quotas, O’Brien and Rickne (2016) find that quotas can have an acceleration
effect on women’s representation in leadership positions, but Bagues and Campa (2017a) find that
quotas are successful in increasing women’s representation in directly elected office, but fail to lift
the barriers to indirectly-elected, leadership positions. This is important because these indirectly-
elected offices hold, in many cases, most of the power. Our theoretical and empirical results show
that the electoral system may have a substantial impact in increasing women’s representation in
both directly- and indirectly-elected offices.
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Throughout the paper, we have shown that an important driver of the results is that voters care
about the gender and quality of the top-listed candidate in CL, while they care about the gender
and quality of all candidates in OL. In the context of our paper, one natural explanation is that
mayors have most of the power and, in CL, only top-listed candidates can become mayor, while, in
OL, any councilor can be appointed mayor. An interesting question is whether voters would behave
in a similar way if the council itself had the executive power and there was no mayor selection or if,
alternatively, the council had to select a mayor but any councilor could be appointed mayor in both
CL and OL. Given that a growing amount of evidence suggests that voter fatigue and inattention
are relevant aspects of voter behavior (Augenblick and Nicholson 2015), voters in CL might still
pay substantially more attention to the traits of the top-listed candidate than to those of other
candidates, i.e. voters, who need to pick one entire party-list, may use the characteristics of the
top-listed candidate as an indicator of the quality of the whole list. In OL, by contrast, voters
are forced to make a decision for any individual vote they cast, which may trigger them to pay
attention to the characteristics of each individual candidate that they have to choose.
While RD designs are well known for providing a credible internal estimation of causal effects,
they can be less conclusive with respect to the external validity of the findings, i.e. what the effects
would be in other contexts. In this regard, note that, if the CL and OL systems were implemented in
other settings, our theoretical model would yield predictions that would depend on voter and party
biases in those settings. Furthermore, the model can be adapted to study the effect of other electoral
systems on female representation. For example, consider the election of several, equally powerful,
representatives. Under a multi-member, proportional-representation system, when deciding which
party to vote for, voters would have to form expectations on the probability that each candidate
of a given list is elected councilor. Under a first-past-the-post electoral system, there would be one
election per district. Of particular interest in this case would be the effect of geographic restrictions
on candidates: either candidates have to be from the district they represent, or from the country
at large. We intend to explore this in future work.
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Figures
Figure 1: CL vs. OL: Model Simulations
A. μ > 0, ν = 0
(a) Strong Norm (b) Moderate Norm (c) Weak Norm
B. μ = 0, ν > 0
(d) Strong Norm (e) Moderate Norm (f) Weak Norm
The lines show the expected difference in the share of female candidates, councilors, or mayors, between the CL and
the OL systems. Results are based on 1 million simulations of the theoretical model using a Pareto distribution for
the competence of candidates. Panel A shows the case of voter bias and no party bias. Panel B shows the case of
party bias and no voter bias. For the strong-norm cases, we choose the parameters βˆ and αˆ such that, when evaluated
at a level of voter bias of 0.05, the probability that the norm is not followed when the most voted candidate is female
is around 3%. For the moderate- and weak-norm cases, we target probabilities that the norm is not followed when
the most voted candidate is female of 15% and 30%, respectively.
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Figure 2: CL vs. OL: Test of Manipulation of the Running Variable
(a) Histogram (b) Test of manipulation
Figure (a) shows the histogram of population sizes. The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Bins are
25-inhabitant wide. Figure (b) shows the manipulation test by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2017): p-value = 0.39.
Figure 3: CL vs. OL: Covariate Smoothness around the Threshold
(a) Average age
(years)
(b) Foreigners (%) (c) EU foreigners
(%)
(d) Ideology (%) (e) Turnout (%)
(f) Unemploy-
ment (%)
(g) year=2003 (h) year=2007 (i) year=2011 (j) year=2015
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Figure 4: CL vs. OL: Effect on the Share of Female Candidates, Councilors, and Mayors
(a) Share of female candidates (%) (b) Share of female councilors (%)
(c) Share of female mayors (%)
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Figure 5: Mayor Selection in OL: Norm of the Most Voted, and Gender Differences in the Norm
(a) All sample
(b) Same gender (c) First male, second female (d) First female, second male
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages are
calculated within 2 p.p.-wide bins of the vote share difference of the top two councilors of the mayor’s party (x-axis).
Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original (unbinned) data.
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Figure 6: CL vs OL: Effects by Previous Exposure to a Female Mayor
A. Non-Exposed Municipalities
(a) Share of female candidates (%) (b) Share of female councilors (%) (c) Share of female mayors (%)
B. Exposed Municipalities
(d) Share of female candidates (%) (e) Share of female councilors (%) (f) Share of female mayors (%)
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Figure 7: The Effect of District Magnitude: 1,000-Inhabitant Threshold
(a) Share of female candidates (%) (b) Share of female councilors (%)
(c) Share of female mayors (%)
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Tables
Table 1: Average Shares of Female Candidates, Councilors, and Mayors
Panel A: By Year
Year Sh Fem Candidates Sh Fem Councilors Sh Fem Mayors
2003 20.8 17.3 12.8
(2,443) (2,443) (2,440)
2007 24.9 21.4 15.1
(2,446) (2,446) (2,445)
2011 26.5 23.2 16.3
(2,307) (2,307) (2,302)
2015 27.7 25.5 18.1
(2,236) (2,236) (2,232)
Average 24.9 21.7 15.3
(N=9,432) (N=9,432) (N=9,419)
Panel A: By Electoral System
Year Sh Fem Candidates Sh Fem Councilors Sh Fem Mayors
CL 28.4 24.6 17.0
(3,296) (3,296) (3,291)
OL 23.0 20.2 14.7
(6,136) (6,136) (6,128)
Average 24.9 21.7 15.3
(N=9,432) (N=9,432) (N=9,419)
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Number of observations in
parentheses.
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Table 2: CL vs. OL: Covariate Smoothness around the Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Mean IK Bandwidth CCT Bandwidth IK Results CCT Results
Average Age (years) 51.33 59 43 0.371 0.133
[N = 3350] [N = 2458] (0.343) (0.396)
Foreigners (%) 4.097 60 52 -0.0494 0.0437
[N = 3466] [N = 2920] (0.343) (0.353)
EU Foreigners (%) 53.14 93 51 -2.509 -1.535
[N = 4641] [N = 2496] (2.389) (2.949)
Ideology (%) 16.02 75 39 -0.363 -1.483
[N = 4322] [N = 2173] (1.782) (2.232)
Turnout (%) 77.20 139 33 0.223 0.245
[N = 8556] [N = 1846] (0.427) (0.630)
Unemployment (%) 3.751 65 29 -0.0898 -0.0419
[N = 3691] [N = 1679] (0.205) (0.270)
year=2003 0.272 88 33 -0.00231 -0.0150
[N = 5150] [N = 1846] (0.0233) (0.0377)
year=2007 0.258 98 37 -0.00151 0.0458
[N = 5716] [N = 2057] (0.0219) (0.0420)
year=2011 0.248 93 34 -0.0188 -0.00618
[N = 5386] [N = 1940] (0.0250) (0.0449)
year=2015 0.229 88 39 0.00456 0.00135
[N = 5078] [N = 2232] (0.0219) (0.0331)
Column (1) shows the mean of the variables. Columns (2) and (3) show the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) and Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) bandwidth values and number of observations for a
placebo test that estimates the effect of CL on the corresponding variable. Columns (4) and (5) show
the results for the placebo tests: each column is a separate local linear regression with a uniform kernel.
Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses.
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Table 3: CL vs. OL: Effect on the Share of Female Candidates, Councilors, and Mayors
Panel A: Share of Female Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CL 1.955** 2.763** 2.911*** 2.510** 3.154***
(0.987) (1.092) (0.765) (1.027) p-v = 0.000
Constant 25.67 24.49 24.48 25.39
(0.860) (1.032) (0.611) (0.889)
Observations 4256 2920 9432 9432 1746
Bw Size 73 51 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Panel B: Share of Female Councilors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CL 2.664** 3.185** 2.346** 2.541* 2.677***
(1.279) (1.500) (1.009) (1.406) p-v = 0.006
Constant 21.63 21.29 21.00 21.77
(1.057) (1.238) (0.775) (1.145)
Observations 4905 2870 9432 9432 1746
Bw Size 85 50 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Panel C: Share of Female Mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CL 3.718 6.324* 3.652** 4.581* 3.479**
(2.630) (3.514) (1.838) (2.633) p-v = 0.045
Constant 15.90 14.65 14.38 15.15
(2.191) (3.029) (1.399) (2.192)
Observations 3756 1844 9419 9419 1744
Bw Size 65 49 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Results from estimating Outcomemt = α+ βCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) +
umt. Each column reports a separate local polynomial regression es-
timate with the specified bandwidth and polynomial order. Separate
polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The last column
shows the results from Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015)’s pro-
cedure. Standard errors clustered by municipality and population in
parentheses.
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Table 4: The Gender of Candidates and Vote Shares
Panel A: CL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FemCand1 -3.809*** -3.315*** -4.907*** 0.330 -3.098***
(0.794) (0.949) (1.104) (2.208) (0.884)
ExpCand1 8.900*** 9.183*** 7.571*** 6.973***
(0.777) (0.889) (1.773) (0.694)
FemCand2−7 -0.841**
(0.327)
ExpCand2−7 5.752***
(0.475)
Observations 3806 2797 2211 586 2797
Sample All All Non-exposed Exposed All
Panel B: OL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FemCand -1.985*** -1.261*** -1.742*** -0.0736
(0.330) (0.319) (0.354) (0.623)
ExpCand 9.451*** 9.736*** 7.514***
(0.468) (0.527) (0.839)
Observations 15129 15117 12252 2865
Sample All All Non-exposed Exposed
Panel A shows the results from estimating V Shpmt = γ(pt) +
γ(m)+θfemFemCandidate1,pmt+θexpExpCandidate1,pmt+pmt
in CL elections. Column (5) adds the gender and the experience
of other candidates on the party-list (i.e. candidates ranked from
2 to 7 on the party-list). Panel B shows the analogous OL regres-
sions, where the unit of observation is an individual candidate.
The sample is restricted to non-incumbent parties. Standard
errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.
Table 5: Mayor Selection in OL: Norm of the Most Voted, and Gender Differences in the Norm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First 0.186** 0.250*** 0.298* -0.144
(0.0765) (0.0941) (0.174) (0.202)
Constant 0.321 0.287 0.253 0.510
(0.0399) (0.0492) (0.0842) (0.104)
Observations 1704 1164 270 270
Sample All Same Male-Female Female-Male
Results from estimating ycmt = θ0 + θ1First + f(xcmt) + cmt. The
sample is restricted to the two most voted councilors of the party of
the mayor, and to non-incumbent parties. Column (2) restricts the
sample to observations in which the two most voted councilors were
of the same gender; column (3), to those in which the most voted was
male and the second was female; and column (4), to those in which the
most voted was female and the second was male. All the regressions use
the IK bandwidth (4.6 p.p.). Standard errors clustered by municipality
in parentheses.
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Table 6: Mayor Selection in OL: Voters Punish Parties that Break the Norm, and Gender Differences
in Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Norm 7.499** 6.493** 7.330** 6.083* 1.268
(3.003) (3.130) (2.997) (3.128) (2.768)
Norm∗GenderDiff -7.831** -7.562**
(3.736) (3.579)
Observations 708 708 708 708 610
Outcome t+4 t+4 t+4 t+4 t (placebo)
Party fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Column (1) shows the results from fitting V Shpmt+4 − V Shpmt =
γ(m) + γ(t) + βNormmt + pmt. Columns (2), (4), and (5) add party
fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) add Norm ∗ GenderDiffmt as a
control. The outcome is V Shpmt−V Shpmt−4 in column (5). The sam-
ple is restricted to non-incumbent parties. Standard errors clustered
by municipality in parentheses.
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Table 7: CL vs. OL: Effects by Previous Exposure to a Female Mayor
Panel A: Share of Female Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXPOSED
CL -3.567* 0.292 -1.894 -3.424 -0.933
(2.058) (2.169) (1.649) (2.149) p-v = 0.587
Constant 25.67 24.49 24.48 25.39
Observations 756 535 1703 1703 324
NON-EXPOSED
CL 3.443*** 3.700*** 4.029*** 3.819*** 4.253***
(0.957) (1.022) (0.723) (0.960) p-v = 0.000
Constant 23.12 23.02 22.06 22.99
Observations 3500 2385 7728 7728 1422
Bw Size 73 51 150 150 31
Panel B: Share of Female Councilors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXPOSED
CL -2.081 0.796 -1.529 -2.932 -0.656
(2.910) (3.275) (2.236) (3.144) p-v = 0.757
Constant 35.26 32.20 34.91 35.73
(2.350)
Observations 881 524 1703 1703 324
NON-EXPOSED
CL 3.708*** 4.249*** 3.282*** 3.732*** 3.678***
(1.159) (1.404) (0.933) (1.296) p-v = 0.000
Constant 18.57 18.44 17.88 18.67
Observations 4024 2346 7728 7728 1422
Bw Size 85 50 150 150 31
Panel C: Share of Female Mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXPOSED
CL 11.31 22.84** 9.486 9.795 9.393**
(8.162) (9.020) (5.912) (8.171) p-v = 0.045
Constant 54.37 50.18 51.38 56.28
Observations 669 508 1699 1699 323
NON-EXPOSED
CL 3.533* 3.072 2.561** 3.206* 2.971**
(1.887) (2.141) (1.232) (1.891) p-v = 0.034
Constant 6.218 6.335 6.164 6.074
Observations 3087 2299 7719 7719 1421
Bw Size 65 49 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Results from estimating Outcomemt = α+ βCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) +
umt, separately for the subsamples of exposed and non-exposed munic-
ipalities. Each column reports a separate local polynomial regression
estimate with the specified bandwidth and polynomial order. Separate
polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The last column
shows the results from Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015)’s pro-
cedure. Standard errors clustered by municipality and population in
parentheses.
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Table 8: The Effect of District Magnitude: 1,000-Inhabitant Threshold
Panel A: Share of Female Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Popmt>1 ,000 1.162 1.764* -0.541 0.722 -1.044
(0.869) (1.001) (0.677) (0.910) p-v = 0.586
Constant 33.29 32.96 34.21 42.22
(0.758) (0.924) (0.538) (6.241)
Observations 2795 1683 6570 6570 148
Bw Size 201 51 150 150 10
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Panel B: Share of Female Councilors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Popmt>1 ,000 0.648 1.428 -0.750 0.174 -0.798
(1.235) (1.317) (0.920) (1.215) p-v = 0.772
Constant 29.50 29.20 30.52 39.74
(1.039) (1.104) (0.736) (8.428)
Observations 2341 1707 6570 6570 148
Bw Size 239 51 150 150 10
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Panel C: Share of Female Mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Popmt>1 ,000 -0.911 0.755 -4.120* -2.069 2.582
(2.618) (3.312) (2.150) (2.756) p-v = 0.740
Constant 17.03 16.65 17.94 15.48
(2.262) (2.840) (1.680) (17.86)
Observations 2560 1329 6554 6554 148
Bw Size 219 51 150 150 10
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Results from estimating Outcomemt = α + β Popmt>1 ,000 +
f(Popmt − 1 , 000 ) + umt. Each column reports a separate local poly-
nomial regression estimate with the specified bandwidth and polynomial
order. Separate polynomials are fitted on each side of the threshold. The last
column shows the results from Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015)’s
procedure. Standard errors clustered by municipality and population in
parentheses.
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Online Appendices
A Probabilistic Voting
The microfoundations for the political part of the model laid out in section 3 are due to Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2002). For simplicity, there is only one group of
voters in each municipality.59 Since the candidates (and the voters) lack commitment, the election is
driven by candidates’ competence, voters’ gender bias, and ideology: Voters prefer more competent
candidates, as these would be more likely to implement good policies. At the same time, voters
might have a bias against female candidates, thus preferring a less competent male candidate.
Finally, which candidates a voter support depends not only on the candidates’ competence (which
is imperfectly observed by voters) and gender, but also on the relative “ideological” attachment of
the voter to the candidate.
Consider the choice of two councilors among four competing candidates in a given municipality.
Denote the candidates by A1, A2, B1, and B2, where it is understood that candidate X1 has
higher competence net of voter bias than candidate X2. Voter i supports candidates A1 and A2 if
the voter’s indirect utility from this pair of candidates exceeds the indirect utility from the other
three possible combinations, by more than some threshold values. These threshold values have a
voter-specific component, reflecting both the ideological attachment and imperfect observation of
competence mentioned before, and an aggregate component.
The voter-specific component, denoted by σi, is drawn from a symmetric uniform distribution.60
For simplicity, we assume that voter i observes competence for both candidates of the same party
with the same observational error.61 The aggregate component, denoted by δ, is drawn from a
symmetric, uniform distribution, δ ∼ U [−1/(2ψ), 1/(2ψ)]. This component represents an aggregate
shock to ideological attachment which is realized after the parties have chosen candidates. The sum
of the two components represents the total bias of voter i in favor of candidates from party A in
the current election.62
Let v(π) denote the indirect utility function of any voter i when pair of candidates π ∈
{A1A2, A1B1, B1A1, B1B2} is in office.63 We assume that
vi(XY ) = sX − μ g(X)=f +
(
σi + δ
)
X∈A + 
[
sY − μ g(Y )=f +
(
σi + δ
)
Y ∈A
]
,
where si is the competence of candidate i, g(i) is its gender, f for female, m for male, μ measures
voter gender bias, X∈A is an indicator for whether a candidate belongs to party A, and  determines
the relative importance of the second placed candidate in voters’ preferences. The latter is used
to distinguish between electoral systems. Given that the mayor is most influential, in CL systems,
 << 1 and for simplicity we will derive results in the limit of  = 0. In contrast, in the OL system,
 = 1 since a priori any elected councilor from the winning party can be selected as mayor.
For the cases of interest in the OL system, voters with strong attachment to party B will vote
59The model can be extended to include two groups, say, male and female voters.
60With only one group of voters, there is no need to specify the distribution of voter specific ideology. With more
than one group, the distributions must be specified, and the relative dispersion of ideologies determines the relative
weights parties attach to groups when selecting candidates.
61Otherwise we would need to specify σi1 and σi2.
62Thus, a given value of σi measures both a relative ideological attachment to party A, and the relative difference
between the actual and observed competence of candidates from both parties. In traditional probabilistic voting
models, the latter component is absent and σi is a pure measure of ideology.
63Note that A2B2 and B2A2 are dominated, respectively, by A1B1 and B1A1 for all voters, and thus can be
disregarded.
B1B2. As ideology is dampened, voters vote B1A1, and for weak ideological attachment to party
A the vote switches to A1B1, with voters with strong ties to party A voting A1A2. Since the party
that gets two councilors wins the election, the election will be decided by the mass of votes A1A2
relative to B1B2. These are determined by the choice of voters that are indifferent on one hand
between A1A2 and A1B1, and those that are indifferent between B1B2 and B1A1. These decisions
AB
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are determined by the comparisons of marginal voters identified by their specific components, σAB
and σBA respectively,
vAB(A1A2) = vAB(A1B1)− (δ + σAB)
sA1 − μ g(A1)=f + 
(
sA2 − μ g(A2)=f
)
= sA1 − μ g(A1)=f + 
(
sB1 − μ g(B1)=f − δ − σAB
)
vBA(B1B2) = vBA(B1A1) + (δ + σBA)
sB1 − μ g(B1)=f + 
(
sB2 − μ g(B2)=f
)
= sB1 − μ g(B1)=f + 
(
sA1 − μ g(A1)=f + δ + σBA
)
Note that, in the CL system, since  = 0, the comparison is just between A1 and B1, as in the
main text.
In the OL system, the probability that party A wins, PA, is given by the probability that
σAB + σBA < 0, i.e. the probability that there are more voters above σAB than voters below σBA.
From the expressions above, PA is given by the probability that 2δ > sA1 + sA2 − sB1 − sB2 −
μ( g(A1)=f + g(A2)=f − g(B1)=f − g(B2)=f ). Given the assumption that δ is uniformly distributed,
this implies
PA =
1
2
+ ψ
1
2
(
sA1 + sA2 − sB1 − sB2 − μ( g(A1)=f + g(A2)=f − g(B1)=f − g(B2)=f )
)
. (15)
A similar derivation implies that, in the CL system, the probability that party A wins the election
is given by (3). In both cases, the probability that party B wins is 1− PA.
B Proofs of Propositions 2 and 4
Proposition 2
From the comparison of (5) and (6) with (7) and (8), it follows that, if μ > 0 and ν = 0, then
PCL(F = 2) > POL(F = 2) and PCL(F = 0) < POL(F = 0), and hence, E[F ]CL − E[F ]OL > 0.64
That is, in the presence of voter bias but no party bias, the CL system leads to more female
candidates than the OL system.
By contrast, in the case of no voter gender bias (μ = 0), if min[ν, β] = ν, then PCL(F =
2) ≤ POL(F = 2) and POL(F = 0) ≤ PCL(F = 0), and thus a priori it is not possible to
determine under which electoral system there will be more female candidates. But, if ν << 1,
then PCL(F = 2) ≈ POL(F = 2) and POL(F = 0) ≈ PCL(F = 0), and both system will lead to
approximately the same share of female candidates.65 When min[ν, β] = β, and ν >> E[f1]−E[f2]
(such that we can approximate min[f2, f1− ν] = f1− ν), POL(F = 2) = P (m1 < f2− 2ν+2β) and
POL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m2) + P (m1 < f1 < m2 + 2β), while P
CL(F = 2) = P (m1 < f1 − ν) and
PCL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m2). Thus, P
OL(F = 0) ≈ PCL(F = 0), while POL(F = 2) < PCL(F = 2),
and there will be more female candidates in the CL system.
Proposition 4
64This follows since in this case PCL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m2) < P (f1 < m2 + μ) = P
OL(F = 0), and PCL(F = 2) =
P (m1 < min[f2, f1 − μ]) > P (m1 < f2 − μ) = POL(F = 2).
65This follows since in this case PCL(F = 2) = P (m1 < min[f2, f1 − ν]) ≈ P (m1 < f2) = POL(F = 2) and
POL(F = 0) = P (f1 < m2) + P (m1 < f1 < m2 + ν) ≈ P (f1 < m2) = PCL(F = 0).
If there is voter bias but no party bias, and β(1 − αμ) > ν = 0, then the share of female
mayors should be approximately the same across electoral systems. The reason for this is that
if a party chooses to have both a male and a female candidate, the probability that the female
candidate receives more votes than the male candidate in the OL system is also P (f1 > m1+ μ) =
PCL(g(ma(j)) = f).66 If there is party bias but no voter bias, the analysis is simpler since the
probability of winning the election will not be affected by candidates’ gender. In this case, while
ν < β we should see more female mayors under the OL system. The reason for this is that if a
party chooses to have both male and female candidates, the probability that the female candidate
66If β(1−αμ) < 0, the male candidate will always be selected as mayor in this case, and there would be less female
mayors in the OL system.
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67Empirical studies have documented that the upper tail distribution of income in most countries follows a Pareto
distribution, see e.g. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011). Thus, we proceed under the assumption that income and
competence are proportional.
68We assume uniform distributions for β and 1
α
: β ∼ U [0, βˆ] and 1
α
∼ U [0, αˆ]. Note that, if there is party bias and
no voter bias, only β matters, while, if there is voter bias and no party bias, only α matters.
69All the results are based on one million simulations.
70For this case, we choose the parameters βˆ and αˆ such that, when evaluated at a level of voter bias of 0.05, the
probability that the norm is not followed when the most voted candidate is female is around 3%.
71For these cases, we target probabilities that the norm is not followed when the most voted candidate is female of
15% and 30%, respectively.
receives more votes than the male candidate in the OL system is now P (f1 > m1) > P (f1 >
m1 + ν) = P
CL(g(ma(j)) = f). But if ν > β, then there will be less female mayors under the OL
system, since now parties will always select the male runner-up over the female winner as mayor,
and the only possibility for a female mayor is when both candidates are women. Thus, in this case
POL(g(ma(j)) = f) = POL(F = 2) < PCL(F = 2) < P (f1 > m1 + ν) = P
CL(g(ma(j)) = f).
C Numerical Simulations
For the numerical simulations we assume that candidates’ competence is drawn from a Pareto
distribution.67 Bartels and Metzing (2017) estimate the Pareto distribution parameter for Spain
from 2001 and 2012. We take their average value of 1.8491, and we posit ψ = 1. We will consider
biases between zero and 0.15. The model predicts that, in OL, if the most voted candidate is
female and the second most voted candidate is male, then the party will select the male candidate
as mayor as long as β [1− μα] < ν, i.e. when the cost of deviating from the mayor selection norm is
lower than the cost of choosing a female mayor. Whether this inequality is satisfied or not depends
on the values that μ, ν, β, and α take for a given municipality in a given election. We make β
and α stochastic such that in equilibrium there is variation in the degree with which the norm is
followed when the most voted candidate is female.68
Panel A of figure 1 considers the case of voter bias (μ) when there is no party bias (ν = 0).69 In
the first graph, we consider the case in which the norm is “strong”, and hence, in the OL system,
the probability that a woman is not appointed mayor after winning the popular vote is low.70 In
the second and third graphs, we consider the cases in which the norm is “intermediate” and “weak”,
respectively.71
We can see that the CL system leads to a higher share of female candidates than the OL system,
and the gap is increasing in voter bias. This is consistent with proposition 2, which states that, if
there is voter bias and no party bias, then the CL system increases the expected share of female
candidates. Intuitively, in OL, parties avoid choosing female candidates for the two spots of the list,
as they will attract fewer votes than male candidates. In CL, by contrast, voters only care about
the gender of the top-listed candidate (as only he or she can become mayor), and hence parties will
avoid choosing a female candidate only for the first spot of the list. Note that this effect is very
similar in the three graphs of Panel A, indicating that the it does not depend on the strength of
the norm.
The CL system also increases the share of female councilors, regardless of the strength of the
norm. This effect, however, is smaller than the one for candidates. In OL, the share of female
councilors is approximately the same as the share of female candidates, as parties internalized
voter bias when choosing candidates. In CL, by contrast, the share of female councilors is lower
than the share of female candidates (but still higher than the share of female councilors in OL). The
reason is that the top-listed candidate is more likely to be male than female, while the converse
is true for the second-listed candidate.72 Given that only the top-listed candidate gets elected
councilor of the party that loses the election, male candidates are, on average, more likely than
female candidates to become councilors in CL.
72With some positive probability, parties choose a male candidate for the first spot that is not the most competent
(due to voter bias), and, therefore, for the second spot, for which parties care only about competence, parties are left
to choose from female potential candidates that are, on average, more competent than male ones.
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Finally, the CL system also increases the share of female mayors. This effect is very sensitive
to the strength of the norm. When the norm is strong, then parties follow the norm even when the
first is female and the second is male. In this case, the difference between the two electoral system
is very small, consistent with proposition 4. As the strength of the norm decreases, however, it
becomes more likely that the OL norm is not followed when the most voted candidate is female and
the second is male, reducing the share of female mayors in this system. Hence, the effect of CL is
on the share of female mayors increases as the OL becomes weaker: when the norm is intermediate
or weak, the CL increases the share of female mayors.
Panel B of figure 1 considers the case of party bias (ν) when there is no voter bias (μ = 0). As
in Panel A, we consider three levels of strength in the norm. For low values of party bias, the two
systems result in approximately the same share of female candidates, as stated in proposition 2. As
party bias increases, CL results in relatively more female candidates. The intuition is as follows. In
CL, parties know that, if they win the election, the top-listed candidate will become mayor. Given
that parties are gender biased and therefore prefer to have a male than a female mayor, they are
less likely to choose a woman as the top-listed candidate. However, they are more likely to choose
a woman for the second spot of the list, as they only care about competence for that position,
and women will be, on average, more competent among the remaining potential candidates (as
explained in footnote 72). These two effects offset each other and the share of female candidates is
always close to 50%. In OL, there are two forces at play. On the one hand, parties have a preference
to choose male candidates, as that increases the probability of eventually having a male mayor.
On the other hand, voters will vote for the most competent candidates, and will seek to enforce
the norm that the most voted candidate becomes the mayor. Hence, choosing (less competent)
male candidates instead of (more competent) female ones makes the party lose votes. As party bias
increases, the former effect dominates and fewer female candidates are chosen in OL. As was the
case with voter bias, note that changes in the strength of the norm have only minor effects on the
share of female candidates (or councilors) in the case of party bias.
For councilors, and moderate values of party bias, the CL system leads to fewer female councilors
than the OL system, consistent with proposition 3. The intuition behind this result is that, as
explained, parties are less likely to put a woman at the top of the list in CL (given party bias,
parties want to avoid that a woman becomes mayor if the party wins the election). For candidates,
this effect is offset because the second spot of the list is more likely to be female. For councilors,
however, this effect is not offset, as only the candidate at the top of the list is elected councilor
from the party that loses the election, and that candidate is less likely to be female. Hence, in CL,
the share of female councilors is below 50%. In OL, by contrast, voters elect the most competent
candidates, and hence the share of female councilors is close to 50%.
Finally, the effect on the share of female mayors depends on the strength of the norm. If the
norm is strong, then the OL system increases the share of female mayors. This finding, stated in
proposition 4, mirrors that for councilors: in the OL system, the probability that a woman is the
most voted candidate of the winning party is approximately 50% for low values of party bias. In
contrast, in the CL system, a small party bias might affect the ordering of candidates within the
lists, leading to a lower probability that a female candidate becomes mayor. If the norm is weak
or intermediate, CL results in a higher share of female mayors than OL. As happened in the case
of voter bias, as the strength of the norm decreases, it becomes more likely that the OL norm is
not followed when the most voted candidate is female, reducing the share of female mayors in this
system. Hence, the difference in the share of female mayors between CL and OL increases as the
norm weakens.
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D Testing Gender Differences in the Norm
We formally test for gender differences in the norm using the following specification:
ycmt = θ0 + θ1 · Firstcmt + g0(xcmt) + g1(xcmt) · Firstcmt + θ2 · Firstcmt · Female1mt + θ3Female1mt
+g1(xcmt) · Firstcmt · Female1mt + g1(xcmt) · Female1mt + θ4 · Firstcmt · Female2mt
+θ5Female2mt + g1(xcmt) · Firstcmt · Female2mt + g1(xcmt) · Female2mt + cmt,
where Female1mt is a dummy that indicates whether the most voted councilor of the mayor’s
list was female, and Female2mt indicates whether the second most voted councilor of the mayor’s
list was female. Hence, these variables only vary by municipality-year, not by councilor. The
interpretation of the coefficients is the following: θ1 is the probability that a male councilor who
obtained the most votes becomes mayor, when the second is also male, relative to the probability
that the second male councilor becomes mayor. That is, it measures the winner effect in a male-
male environment. The rest of the coefficients are interpreted analogously. There is a bias against
women if θ2 < 0, θ3 > 0, θ4 > 0, or θ5 < 0.
The results of this test are shown in column (1) of table A4. All of the coefficients are statistically
significant and consistent with a bias against women in the norm. In the rest of the columns of table
A4, we split the sample according to previous exposure to a female mayor. The results indicate
that the bias is not present in exposed municipalities.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A1: CL vs. OL: Effect on the Share of Female Candidates, Councilors, and Mayors—
Robustness to Bandwidth Choice
(a) Share of female candidates (%)
(b) Share of female councilors (%)
(c) Share of female mayors (%)
Circles represent the estimated treatment effect, using different bandwidth choices (x-axis), from Outcomemt =
α + βCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) + umt. Lines represent the 95% confidence interval (standard errors clustered by
municipality and population).
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Figure A2: Mayor Selection in OL: Placebo Test—“Effect” of the Most Voted on Being Female
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variable (1 if female, 0
if male). Averages are calculated within 2 p.p.-wide bins of the vote share difference of the top two councilors of the
mayor’s party (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original (unbinned) data.
Figure A3: Mayor Selection in OL: Norm of the Most Voted—Robustness to Bandwidth Choice
Circles represent the estimated treatment effect from fitting ycmt = θ0+ θ1 · first+ g0(xcmt)+ g1(xcmt) · first+ cmt,
using different bandwidth choices (x-axis). Lines represent the 95% confidence interval (standard errors clustered by
municipality).
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Figure A4: 1,000-Inhabitant Threshold: Test of Manipulation of the Running Variable
(a) Histogram (b) Test of manipulation
Figure (a) shows the histogram of population sizes. The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Bins are
50-inhabitant wide. Figure (b) shows the manipulation test by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2017): p-value = 0.63.
Figure A5: CL vs OL: The Effect on the Party of the Mayor
(a) PP Mayor (b) PSOE Mayor
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Figure A6: CL vs OL: The Effect of on the Share of Female Candidates and Councilors, by Party
Share of female candidates (%)
(a) PP (b) PSOE
Share of female councilors (%)
(c) PP (d) PSOE
Share of female mayors (%)
(e) PP (f) PSOE
The unit of observation is a municipality-election. Circles represent the local averages of the variables. Averages
are calculated within 25 p.p.-wide bins of population (x-axis). Continuous lines are a linear fit over the original
(unbinned) data.
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: 1,000-Inhabitant Threshold: Covariate Smoothness around the Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Mean IK Bandwidth CCT Bandwidth IK Results CCT Results
Average Age (years) 46.60 247 147 -0.108 -0.184
[N = 2903] [N = 1729] (0.366) (0.452)
Foreigners (%) 6.205 267 84 0.236 -1.113
[N = 3132] [N = 1006] (0.558) (0.859)
EU Foreigners (%) 52.13 215 116 -1.976 -3.683
[N = 2493] [N = 1335] (2.529) (3.252)
Ideology (%) 2.402 317 125 1.862 0.272
[N = 3824] [N = 1467] (1.522) (1.776)
Turnout (%) 76.83 308 136 0.288 0.503
[N = 3708] [N = 1585] (0.573) (0.779)
Unemployment (%) 5.024 189 117 0.427 0.671*
[N = 2194] [N = 1366] (0.291) (0.347)
year=2003 0.261 323 33 -0.0149 -0.0186
[N = 3921] [N = 1698] (0.0271) (0.0392)
year=2007 0.229 307 37 0.0290 0.0230
[N = 3683] [N = 1839] (0.0225) (0.0349)
year=2011 0.259 271 34 0.00529 -0.00598
[N = 3185] [N = 1518] (0.0253) (0.0381)
year=2015 0.259 277 39 -0.0222 0.0192
[N = 3276] [N = 1199] (0.0282) (0.0464)
Column (1) shows the mean of the variables. Columns (2) and (3) show the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) and Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) bandwidth values and number of observations for a
placebo test that estimates the effect of CL on the corresponding variable. Columns (4) and (5) show
the results for the placebo tests: each column is a separate local linear regression with a uniform kernel.
Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses.
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Table A2: Effect of CL on the Party of the Mayor
Panel A: PP Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CL -0.0113 -0.0187 0.0156 -0.0297 -0.030
(0.0362) (0.0443) (0.0307) (0.0416) p-v = 0.299
Constant 0.479 0.477 0.444 0.504
(0.0275) (0.0353) (0.0226) (0.0325)
Observations 4376 2135 7194 7194 1342
Bw Size 98 50 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Panel B: PSOE Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CL 0.0153 0.0310 0.0145 0.0175 0.024
(0.0390) (0.0426) (0.0285) (0.0388) p-v = 0.347
Constant 0.284 0.269 0.277 0.267
(0.0318) (0.0352) (0.0213) (0.0307)
Observations 2639 1729 7194 7194 1342
Bw Size 61 41 150 150 31
Bw Method IK CCT All All Local
Polynomial 1 1 1 2 randomization
Results from estimating Outcomemt = α+ βCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) + umt.
Each column reports a separate local polynomial regression estimate with
the specified bandwidth and polynomial order. Separate polynomials are
fitted on each side of the threshold. The last column shows the results
from Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015)’s procedure. Standard errors
clustered by municipality and population in parentheses.
Table A3: Effect of CL on the Share of Female Candidates, Councilors, and Mayors, by Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Candidates Candidates Councilors Councilors Mayors Mayors
CL 3.344** 3.454** 3.312* 3.601* 6.409 -0.216
(1.309) (1.687) (1.954) (1.945) (3.922) (5.084)
Constant 22.85 27.77 21.21 21.86 15.63 20.51
(1.056) (1.499) (1.536) (1.505) (2.730) (3.950)
Observations 5317 4975 2453 6108 1541 1159
Party PP PSOE PP PSOE PP PSOE
p-value: test of equal coefficients 0.96 0.92 0.31
Results from estimating Outcomemt = α+ βCLmt + f(Popmt − 250) + umt. The sample is restricted to PP (columns
(1), (3) and (5)) or PSOE (columns (2), (4) and (6)) observations. Each column reports a separate local polynomial
regression estimated with the bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), being equal to 73 (columns (1) and
(2)), 85 (columns (3) and (4)), and 65 (columns (5) and (6)) inhabitants. Separate polynomials are fitted on each
side of the threshold. The last column shows the results from Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015)’s procedure.
Standard errors clustered by municipality and population in parentheses.
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Table A4: Mayor Selection in OL, by Previous Exposure to a Female Mayor
(1) (2) (3)
First 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.197**
(0.0391) (0.0427) (0.0965)
First*Female1 -0.116 -0.205* 0.136
(0.0842) (0.108) (0.145)
Female1 0.0749* 0.127** -0.0287
(0.0436) (0.0567) (0.0734)
First*Female2 0.218*** 0.296*** -0.108
(0.0741) (0.0790) (0.156)
Female2 -0.126*** -0.178*** 0.0676
(0.0369) (0.0389) (0.0798)
Constant 0.319 0.330 0.277
(0.0202) (0.0223) (0.0486)
Observations 4430 3488 942
Sample All Not exposed Exposed
Results from estimating ycmt = θ0 + θ1 · firstcmt +
g0(xcmt)+ g1(xcmt) · firstcmt+ θ2 · firstcmt · female1mt+
θ3female1mt+ g1(xcmt) · firstcmt · female1mt+ g1(xcmt) ·
female1mt + θ4 · firstcmt · female2mt + θ5female2mt +
g1(xcmt)·firstcmt·female2mt+g1(xcmt)·female2mt+cmt.
All the regressions use the IK bandwidth (4.6 p.p.). The
sample is restricted to non-incumbent parties. Standard
errors clustered by municipality in parentheses.
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